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The so called “march to democracy” worldwide, which is often coupled with decentralization
with its attendant focus on “good governance”, brings to fore questions about state-marketcivil society relations. Reshaping these relations now becomes even more compelling in the
light of the financial and economic crisis. While the crisis is said to sound a death knell to
neoliberalism, it remains the task of pro-poor and pro-democracy movements to shape
alternatives at the global, national, and local levels.
This paper analyzes NGO engagement with the state to bring about local development in
Cambodia and the Philippines. Decentralization reforms followed the transition from
authoritarian to democratic rule in the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand, and the postconflict reconstruction in Cambodia. Good governance, civil society building and local
development/anti-poverty programs, are key elements in the international package of support
for democracy worldwide (see Carothers 2002). Thus, decentralization is claimed to be “a
fashion of our time” 2. It is celebrated for bringing the state closer to the communities;
ascribing it with meaning of promoting democratic and developmental ends, including the
promise of good governance.
Indeed, in recent years, there is a growing convergence between the discourse of
development and the discourse of democracy. The shift to the rights-based approach (RBA)
in development allows NGOs and donors to engage with the “politics of poverty”. The
search for a more meaningful democracy (and sustainable development) allows democratic
activists, NGOs and social movements to bring back the people’s voice in democratic
institutions, thru participation. Such parallel discursive movements find a meeting point in
participatory local governance, the reconfiguring of central-local state relations and state-civil
society relations facilitated by decentralization reforms.
In Southeast Asia, Cambodia and the Philippines present useful and relevant settings for
learning lessons on civil society engagement of local governance and local development in
the context of decentralization. In these countries NGO and ordinary citizens’ participation
in local governance had been institutionalized and NGOs have undertaken a variety of
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participatory local development strategies. The question is, to what extent are these
participatory initiatives bringing about inversion of governance priorities in favor of pro-poor
and sustainable development outcomes?
Consciously reminding ourselves of this key question is deemed critical at this time when the
participation mantra has seeped through the various governance and development discourses.
The preponderance of participatory programs promoted by different groups with diverse and
sometimes conflicting agenda has pointed to the malleability of participatory processes (see
Mohan and Stokke 2000). Elsewhere, we have concluded that decentralization does not
automatically lead to democratic deepening (see Alicias and Velasco 2007). In the same
vein, I argue, in this paper, that participatory development process does not always lead to
pro-poor sustainable development outcomes.
Local Participatory Development Planning in Cambodia
Cambodia is regarded as a paradigmatic case of a new world order, wherein the United
Nations became an interventionist for peace, command economy a passé, and democracy a
new game worldwide (Ojendal and Lilja 2009, Hughes 2009). The country was a test case
for post-conflict reconstruction and as such was at the receiving end of an unprecedented
volume and form of international assistance, making it an “aid-dependent community”
(Hughes 2009). In less than a decade (1995-2003), more than USD 4 billion in aid was
infused into the country and had distorted the economy (Earl 2009).
The outpouring of international aid went into reconstruction and development work, which in
the early 1990s were spent mostly on humanitarian and relief work in the country’s border
provinces with Thailand. After the UNTAC-sponsored elections in 1993, more bilateral and
multilateral donors with sizable budgets came together in Cambodia to assist in the transition
to liberal democracy and market economy. There was a surge in international and local
NGOs working on various development themes, as donors directly channeled aid money
through NGOs in the hope of developing Cambodia’s civil society (Meas and McCallum
2009, Richardson 2009). From 40 NGOs (all international) in 1990, international and local
NGOs there increased to over 600 active ones in 2007/08 (Meas and McCallum 2009:16).
The NGOs have played a key role in the way development work progressed in Cambodia
from the 1990s to the present 3. However, by early 2000, major donors looking for
measurable impacts have begun to be skeptical of the effectiveness of NGOs in bringing
about development results and political reforms (Ibid:12). Such skepticism coupled with
shifting donor thematic priorities “hastened a growing emphasis on the empowerment of local
authorities and groups through the process of civil society development and the championing
of decentralization” (Ibid).
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Thus began the push for decentralization reforms in the country which was institutionalized
through the passage in 2001 of two laws--the Law on Election of Commune/Sangkat
Councils and the Law on Administration and Management of Communes/Sangkats. In 2002,
Cambodia had a taste of local democracy with the first commune elections.
At the outset, decentralization was purposely crafted for poverty reduction through increased
service delivery and local investment. By allowing citizens to participate in local
development planning, the designers had hoped that imbibing a sense of community
ownership to development path will churn out favorable outcomes to alleviate poverty. The
other two implicit aims of decentralization were to enhance collaboration among political
parties and to build a culture of peace. These were seen as necessary remedies for a country
coming out of a conflict situation (see among others Rusten, et. al 2004, Hughes 2007). As
the decentralization reform progresses, its aims have shifted to promoting “democratic
development” 4.
CSOs and villagers’ participation in local development is particularly emphasized in comingup with Commune Development Plan (CDP) and Commune Investment Plan (CIP), a
participatory bottom-up planning process 5. This participatory process starts with community
meetings at the villages and ends in commune integration meeting which harmonizes all
development initiatives implemented by service providers and NGOs at the commune level. 6
More recently, community-based organizations (CBOs) are mandated to participate in the
local public bidding of services as “local service providers”.
This task of embedding democratic and participatory values and practices was never easy.
Until recently, Cambodia never had an instance when ordinary citizens participate in
governance affairs. Accountability is an alien concept to Cambodian parlance, often
misunderstood to mean “accounting” (COMFREL 2008). Hierarchies and patron-client
relations have been the dominant features guiding social and political relations (see among
others Chandler 1993, Ledgerwood 1992, Freison 1996, Ojendal 2005). Moreover, the
people’s relation with the local state is peppered with suspicion and apathy. The commune
council is historically a weak administrative unit which gained a bad reputation when it was
largely used an instrument for political control for the mobilization of forced labor and
soldiers (Ojendal 2005). In terms of community identity, the village (as opposed to the
commune) is the primary source of social and geographic entity of most Khmers.
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Nevertheless, there are certainly glimpse of dynamism evolving out of local participatory
governance experiments. It has been observed that more and more ordinary people are taking
part in development planning and more people (even women) have become interested in local
politics and governance affairs, cutting the distance between the state and society
(COMFREL 2008; Ojendal and Kim 2009; Alicias and Cruz 2010/2011). Even if to a large
extent, citizens’ participation is just an instrument for something else, changing attitudes are
observed among local officials and ordinary citizens, and in local political dynamics, which
might lead to a positive change in political culture. Ojendal and Kim (2006/09) conclude that
people are no longer afraid of local governments/officials-- that the culture of fear is replaced
by high admiration. Improvements on the discharge of administrative functions of commune
councils are noted by local authorities and the villagers. As one commune chief explains, “in
previous time, local people always avoided the authorities (CC), but now they are asking
questions and are giving suggestions to improve their living conditions. At present, it seems
the local authorities have changed attitudes and understand their functions better” (Alicias
and Cruz 2011).
The socio-economic projects (micro-credit, cow and rice banks, communal irrigation
management, alternative agriculture, natural resource management) borne out of participatory
local development processes create a meaningful contribution in improving local economy
(in terms of food security and increasing income opportunities and employment); developing
human resources and social groups in the villages; and enhancing community cohesion.
There is also an observed shift in the nature of local development projects—broadening the
infrastructure-biased projects (road, bridges, school buildings) to include livelihood, and
other social services such as health and sanitation as well as natural resource management.
Unlike the situation before when development programs were focused on infrastructure
projects and only private business companies were able to get government contracts, the new
local bidding mechanism enabled community groups to co-deliver local services, thus
enhancing citizen’s influence in the design and implementation of select services.
Yet, despite these positive developments, serious challenges confront participatory local
development in Cambodia as participatory processes operate outside of existing political
dynamics while satisfying donors’ interest for participation and measurable impacts
(Rocamora 2007).
The country is still far from the pluralist democracy envisioned by the UN-assisted transition.
The current political situation clearly shows a skewed distribution of political power, in favor
of the Cambodia People’s Party’s (CPP) dominance 7. The political system and electoral
system (not to mention political culture) enhances upward accountability by the elected
politicians and bureaucrats to the party and higher-level officials rather than to the electorate.
This upward accountability dampens dynamism at commune level and limits the possibility
of pro-poor sustainable development outcomes.
For instance, rights-based organizations working on land and common natural resources
conflicts are frustrated with the fact that these issues are still decided at the top-level despite
the presence of local mechanisms for resolution. In other words, even if the Commune
Council has a mandate, local authorities waive their rights to dialogue and settle land
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conflicts especially when the perpetrator of the conflict are higher authorities or wealthy
people with government connection. The ruling party tends to enforce strict party discipline
which makes it difficult for elected officials—especially at the Commune and District level to
address the issues brought to them without violating party expectations. In fact, land issues
and land rights are not at all taken-up in the CDP planning.
Moreover, while the CDP planning and other local participatory mechanisms are
characterized by active participation from the CSOs, villagers and local state (Commune
Council and village officials) the disciplining effect of these institutional arrangements
discourages people to raise issues and make demands outside the prescribed norms and rules.
Therefore, while there is accommodation of CBO/NGO’s involvement in terms of social
services projects which are seen as non-controversial (health, education, small-scale
livelihood projects), there is indifference to the issue of rights to land and common natural
resources where conflicts with the rich, with higher-level government and with big business
often occur.
Echoing Hughes (2009:217-218) circumspect conclusion of a participatory local development
project in Cambodia, it seems participatory local development have “delivered tangible,
popular, and useful benefits to villagers, in response to their own assessments of their needs.
However, it was less successful in empowering villagers with respect to a wider, imagined
sphere beyond the lived world of the village, kin and patronage networks, and in encouraging
face-to-face encounters between villagers and influential elites outside those usual networks”.
Local Development Planning thru Participatory Rural Appraisal in the Philippines:
In the Philippines, decentralization reforms came in the early 1990s. The Philippine Local
Government Code of 1991 not only devolved substantial powers and functions to subnational government units, it also opened up active engagement of civil society organizations
in local governance, and allowed the entry of new, and sometimes reform-minded and
progressive, players in local politics 8.
The experience of Barangay Bayan Governance Consortium (BBGC) 9 in citizens’
participation in local governance offers valuable lessons and challenges. BBGC’s signature
initiative is the barangay (village) development planning through participatory resource
appraisal or BDP-PRA. The strategy maximizes available institutional mechanisms for
citizen participation to push for pro-poor development policies and programs at the village
level.
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In most cases, citizens’ participation in these planning processes is proven positive—priority
projects reflect “a shift away from traditional (village) projects, which did not always address
people’s development priorities and were often a source of patronage through kickbacks”
(Estrella and Iszatt 2004). The novelty of the process was a welcome respite from the
traditional patronage way of determining development projects and distributing resources. It
was also a new way of churning out needed information and a learning experience for
decision-makers. As elected local officials in the town of Surallah in Mindanao explains,
“there’s a big difference in the sense that before when we made plans there was no certainty
about our plans, unlike now where we have specific targets and goals to achieve”; “we’re
very happy because it made the council realize their functions and obligations” (Iszatt
2004:171).
The pledging session accompanying the BDP-PRA process has also facilitated and widened
the LGU’s access to national level resources (Ibid:175-176). An equally significant impact is
the way the BDP-PRA process provided a sense of empowerment to ordinary citizens and
facilitated direct participation of citizens in local governance. The following words of a
woman participant ring true for most participants: “We became aware and critical of what
was happening in our community. We realized that women have capabilities as well” (Alicias
2004:200).
However, despite its successes in opening-up spaces of participation and changing patronagebased governance processes, the BDP-PRA process faces challenges in sustainability and
scaling-up. As the innovation relies heavily on the political will of incumbent reform-minded
officials, it is vulnerable to changes according to the electoral cycle. As the case of Surallah
illustrates, the BDP-PRA process ceased when the incumbent Mayor lost the election and was
replaced by a new politician (Iszatt 2004). Local governments face severe constraints in
terms of fiscal and human resources, which affect the realization of development projects.
Although some communities have been able to implement many of their priority projects (an
indication of effective resource mobilization), many village development plans end up in
unfunded wish lists (Ibid, p.310-312).
This has led to a realization of the need to scale-up the participatory development planning
process to the municipal (town) level where there are more power and available resources.
But, opening up municipal governance to participatory processes proved difficult. Wary of
the political risks involved in opening up governance to participation, local politicians would
oftentimes prefer the patronage/populist way of delivering public goods and services, as this
would certainly bring about victory in the next election.
More importantly, concern over the extent to which such a process contributes to deepening
democracy and transforming local governance or whether it is just a way of creating new
local political patrons was raised on several occasions. “…Individual officials can capitalize
on the BDP-PRA to gain access to resources, take credit for barangay achievements, and earn
votes, with little serious regard for creating democratic, accountable institutions and
supporting people’s participation in governance. The BDP-PRA and other consortium
programs may inadvertently create ‘sophisticated traditional politicians’…” (Naraval
2004:60)
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Conclusion and Propositions:
To establish a linear connection between citizen participation and pro-poor outcomes is
tempting but naïve; more so if we blindly equate participation with empowerment and
transformation. This is not to say that participation isn’t valuable, because it is, especially
within the framework of democratic deepening. At the core of the deepening democracy
perspective is the idea that ordinary men and women are capable of taking initiatives and
making decisions; that collective action offers possibilities for change.
But, as experiences in Cambodia and the Philippines suggest, local participatory development
does not always bring about pro-poor sustainable outcomes. In Cambodia, local participatory
development is in shaky ground as it operates outside of political dynamics; the potential for
democratic dynamism is bunged by a host of political-economic factors. Acquiescence of
most development NGOs to government’s plans and rules brings about concrete and
responsive impacts to the communities but at the same time limits the possibility of even
talking about development issues beyond the purview of the commune. Such situation runs
the risk of participatory development that ends-up maintaining the status quo. In the
Philippines, the participatory development process and its resulting projects could not be
sustained as they are contingent to electoral cycle and the availability of development funds,
which often flow through the circuits of patronage. Moreover, participatory development
could unexpectedly produce “sophisticated traditional politicians”.
Making local participatory development deliver pro-poor sustainable outcomes takes more
than just citizen participation. There is more to transformative participatory governance than
having participatory mechanisms. This calls for relating participation to politics and issues of
power. Hickey and Mohan (2004) argues that for participation to be transformative, it should
be linked to broader political project of deepening democracy, social and (environmental)
justice. For it to be empowering it should aim to transform power.
Taking an empowering perspective on participation calls for establishing a clear link between
participation and accumulation of power. Progressive development work means delivering
the goods and raising the political temperature at the local level, so that people can actively
engage in a wider range of everyday democratization struggles in their localities. It means
more than “thickening civil society”. It means raising people’s political acumen so that they
can creatively mobilize at different levels. It means contributing to the realizing the power of
the “powerless” in autonomous spheres.
A progressive development work should therefore also facilitate the flow of information and
analysis to inform people’s long-range views of local development. It means linking local
governance concerns with social movement struggles and issues of sustainable development.
The ‘local’ can no longer be taken at face value, i.e anything at the sub-national or grassroots
level. The roots of local problems are always in part found elsewhere.
Finally, unleashing the transformative potential of participation also entails contextualizing
participatory processes within the existing political dynamics. For Southeast Asia, this means
situating participation within the process of political reform and democratization.
###################
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